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I
David Hume wrote two books on religion. His Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, published in 1779 three years after his death, is the best 
known of these by far. Twenty years previously, however, Hume had 
published (the now relatively unknown) Natural History of Religion (1757) 
as one of four short ‘Dissertations’. The two books have similar titles, but 
they are importantly different, and Hume himself specifies the difference 
at the start of his Natural History.
As  every  enquiry,  which  regards  religion,  is  of  the  utmost 
importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge 
our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and 
that  concerning  its  origin  in  human  nature.  Happily,  the  first 
question, which is the most important, admits of the most obvious, at 
least the clearest solution. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an 
intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious 
reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary 
principles of Theism and Religion. But the other question, concerning 
the origin of religion in human nature, is exposed to some more 
difficulty. The belief of invisible, intelligent power has been very 
generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in all ages; 
. . . What those principles [of human nature] are, which give rise to 
the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which 
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direct its operation, is the subject of our present enquiry1).
In  retrospect,  Hume’s  claim  that  religion’s  foundation  in  reason  is 
‘obvious’ seems a little disingenuous since the principal effect of the 
Dialogues is to reveal just how problematic the traditional arguments for 
God’s existence are. It is known that Hume worked on these Dialogues over 
a very long period, so it is possible that he changed his mind about just 
how ‘obvious’ the truth of philosophical theism is. On the other hand, it 
has long been noted that, despite the many intellectual difficulties 
uncovered in Parts I-XI of the Dialogues, in Part XII there seems to be 
something of a volte-face. Philo, who raises most to the difficulties, and who 
is often taken to be Hume’s own voice, nevertheless asserts that when we 
look  around  the  world  ‘a  purpose,  an  intention,  a  design  strikes 
everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker, and no man can be 
so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it’2). This and other 
passages (in the first Enquiry and elsewhere) have prompted an enduring 
debate about whether Hume himself did or did not think ‘the theistic 
hypothesis’ to be true, and if so, what exactly he took that hypothesis to 
be. The question is ultimately irresolvable, not least because we cannot 
assume that any of the voices in the Dialogues is to be identified as Hume’s.
   This issue is one about Hume’s view of theology, and of the doctrine of 
theism. But there is also a different, less widely discussed issue. This is his 
view of religion. The two are not the same. Theology is the subject matter 
of the Dialogues. Religion is the subject matter of the Natural History. It is a 
division that can be found in Hume’s writings more generally. The 
plausibility (or implausibility) of theological beliefs is the focus, not only 
of the Dialogues, but also of Sections X and XI of the first Enquiry entitled 
respectively, ‘Of Miracles’ and ‘Of a particular Providence and a Future 
1 ) David Hume, Natural History of Religion, ed. J C A Gaskin, Oxford World 
Classics, 1993, (hereafter NHR) p.135
2 ) David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ed. J C A Gaskin, Oxford 
World Classics 1993, (hereafter Dialogues) p.116
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State’, while the subject of religion – its source in human nature and its 
function in society – is the focus not only of the Natural History, but of the 
essay ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’, as well as parts of Hume’s History 
of England.
   This division of subject – philosophical theology as opposed to 
philosophy of religion – has tended to be obscured by the fact that most 
writers of the Scottish Enlightenment period, Hume included, used 
‘natural religion’ in two distinguishable ways. In some contexts the 
contrast is with ‘revealed religion’. In this sense ‘natural religion’ refers to 
religious beliefs that are inferred from, or based upon, the empirical 
evidence of the natural world, rather than founded on Scripture as 
revelation. The arguments that the Dialogues explore are ‘natural religion’ 
in this sense, but they might better be referred to as ‘natural theology’, a 
more familiar term nowadays.
   In other contexts, however, ‘natural religion’ refers to the innate 
religious sensibilities and proclivities of human beings that underlie their 
adherence to any religion, and their participation in its practices. Natural 
religion in this sense, is what it might better be referred to as ‘natural 
religiosity’. But for present purposes it is simplest to distinguish ‘natural 
theology’ from ‘natural religion’.
   The occasional positive assertions that Hume makes about the evidence 
of ‘design’ in nature (as in Part XII of the Dialogues) makes it uncertain as 
to what, precisely, Hume thought about ‘the theistic hypothesis’. It is 
evident, though, from many of his writings, that he was generally hostile 
to religion. No one reading the Natural History, the essay ‘Of miracles’ and 
other sections of the first Enquiry, or the essay ‘Of superstition and 
enthusiasm’, could fail to detect the scorn and derision that it he heaps on 
Catholic and Protestant alike, branding all truly popular religion 
‘superstition’, dismissing widespread practices of worship as ‘frivolous 
observances’, and denying that theological beliefs are ever widely held 
because of their rationality. ‘One may safely affirm’, he roundly declares, 
‘that all popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite 
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for absurdity and contradiction’3), and in a letter written not long before 
his death, he looked forward to a world in which ‘all the Churches shall be 
converted  into  Riding  Schools,  Manufactories,  Tennis  Courts  or 
Playhouses’4).
   Yet, despite all his strictures, Hume, no less than his devout American 
contemporary Jonathan Edwards, can be found employing the expression 
‘true religion’. Moreover, it seems to play a crucial role in his essay ‘Of 
Superstition and Enthusiasm’ where superstition and enthusiasm are 
declared  to  be  ‘the  corruptions  of  true  religion’5).  But  if  Hume  is  a 
theological sceptic, what can he mean by true religion?
   In  the  end,  it  may  be  no  easier  to  answer  this  question  than  to 
determine Hume’s final view about theism. However, in its consideration 
it is essential that we bear in mind the distinction between ‘natural 
theology’ as a ‘scientific’ inquiry, and ‘natural religion’ as a set of human 
dispositions and practices. ‘The first ideas of religion’, Hume writes, ‘arose 
not from a contemplation of nature, but from a concern with regard to the 
events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the 
human mind’6). In other words, natural theology, which is about the 
origins of nature, the laws by which it operates, and its future course, is an 
intellectual discipline like science. Indeed the terms theology, philosophy 
and science were not sharply distinguished in Hume’s day, all of them 
being taken to refer to intellectual inquiry in general. Like science, then, 
theology is a specialized activity in which relatively few people engage, or, 
indeed, are capable of engaging. By contrast, large numbers of people, 
without evident intellectual gifts or interest engage in religious practices. 
This is because these are rooted in our common humanity. They reflect a 
3 ) NHR, p.166
4 ) David Hume to Andrew Stuart of Torrance, reprinted in Philosophy and Religion 
in Enlightenment Britain ed. Ruth Savage, Oxford University Press, 2012, p.257
5 ) David Hume, Essays, moral, political and literary, Oxford University press, 1963, 
Essay X p.75
6 ) NHR p.139
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condition necessarily shared by all human beings, namely, the need to 
wrest a living from a world that is variously resistant to human effort and 
uncertain in its outcomes. Theology, like science, is theoretical, explaining 
the world; religion is practical, adapting, and adapting to, the world for 
practical purposes. This ‘practical’ world is shaped by factors about which 
we are largely ignorant – the weather, the seasons, economic cycles, 
sources of disease – and it is full of risks of which we are naturally fearful 
– injury, illness, famine and so on. This is why, Hume thinks, the roots of 
religion are to be found in ignorance and fear rather than rational belief 
and inquiry. While theology seeks satisfactory explanations for the 
observed phenomena of nature, religion seeks ways of coping with the 
human condition. ‘True’ religion, accordingly, will be whatever form of 
religious practice most adequately accommodates, or ameliorates, this 
practically potent mix of ignorance and fear.
II
Hume’s conception of ‘true religion’ has become obscured in part because 
of the remarkable success of the Dialogues, especially among philosophers. 
Over time the Dialogues have dramatically changed philosophy’s approach 
to religion. In the two hundred years since their publication, philosophy of 
religion has become almost exclusively an exercise in philosophical 
theology, principally concerned with religion’s ‘foundation in reason’, to 
use Hume’s own language. By contrast, its ‘origin in human nature’ has 
generally ceased to be of interest to philosophers, and come to be regarded 
as a topic more suited to empirical anthropology. 
   In its own day, however, the Natural History of Religion commanded 
philosophical attention because it was recognized as a further contribution 
to an already well-established inquiry. According to the editor of the 
Clarendon edition, Hume’s ‘natural history of religion was not remarkably 
innovative by the time Hume commenced his dissertation on the subject’7), 
7 ) See Tom L Beauchamp, ‘The Intellectual Background’, Clarendon Edition of the 
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but written in the knowledge of several much larger scale works, both 
English and French. Most of these are now almost entirely forgotten, but 
more important for present purposes, is its relation to works that have not 
been forgotten, including some by major figures in European philosophy, 
notably Spinoza, Kant, Schleiermacher, Mill and Nietzsche.
   Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (1670) preceded the Natural 
History by ninety years. Though it employs different terminology, it has a 
similar fundamental concern – to distinguish ‘faith’, properly so called, 
from ‘philosophy’. ‘The aim of philosophy’, Spinoza writes, ‘is, quite 
simply, truth, while the aim of faith, as we have abundantly shown, is 
nothing other than obedience and piety’8). Spinoza was writing in a 
different context and at a different time, of course, but, a connection can be 
traced between his thoughts on this topic and the Scottish intellectual 
milieu within which Hume was educated. Just seven years after Spinoza’s 
Theological-Political Treatise appeared, Henry Scougall, Professor of Divinity 
at King’s College, Aberdeen published The Life of God in the Soul of Man 
(1677). Scougall died at the early age of twenty-eight, but after his death 
his personal library was found to contain a copy of Spinoza’s Treatise. 
Scougall’s own short book, which for nearly two hundred years was 
regarded as a classic of its kind9), addresses similar themes, but it employs 
terminology much closer to Hume’s than Spinoza’s. Influenced also by the 
Cambridge Platonists, The Life of God in the Soul of Man opens with a 
chapter entitled ‘Of the nature of true religion’, and its first two sections 
are headed ‘Mistakes about religion’ and ‘What religion is’10). On the other 
Works of David Hume: A Dissertation on the Passions and The Natural History of 
Religion, (Clarendon Press Oxford 2007) p.219
8 ) Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise ed. Jonathan Israel, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007, p.519
9 ) See Isabel Rivers, ‘Scougal’s The Life of God in the soul of man: the fortunes of a 
book, 1676-1830’ in Philosophy and Religion in Enlightenment Britain ed. Ruth 
Savage, Oxford University Press, 2012
10) See further, G D Henderson, ‘Henry Scougall’ in The Burning Bush: Studies in 
Scottish Church History, Edinburgh, St Andrew Press, 1957
Natural Theology and Natural Religion in the Scottish Enlightenment 73
hand Scougall is closer to Spinoza than Hume in this; whereas Hume’s 
main interest is in debunking ‘false’ religion, Scougall’s aim is to advance 
‘true’ religion.
   Though it is impossible to say whether Hume knew anything of 
Scougall, Scougall’s book was widely read, and the subject of ‘true 
religion’  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  many  of  Hume’s  Scottish 
contemporaries. In both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith investigates the source and function of religion in a 
fashion very similar to Hume. So does Lord Kames (Henry Home) in the 
third volume of his Sketches of the History of Man (3rd edition, 1788), as well 
as in his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (3rd edition 
1779).  Thomas  Reid,  too,  touches  here  and  there  on the  topic  in  his 
(unpublished)  lectures  on  natural  theology,  when  he  connects  the 
importance of religion with the satisfaction of basic needs, and the pursuit 
of the moral life.
   This investigation into ‘true religion’ was not confined to Scotland. In 
the same period, in a somewhat different spirit, Immanuel Kant wrote an 
investigation into Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). This 
work is the outcome, importantly, of an explicit rejection of the kind of 
arguments Hume seemed to demolish in the Dialogues. The concepts 
involved in the exercise of human reason and the pursuit of understanding 
are  structuring  concepts  of  the  human  mind.  Consequently,  and 
necessarily  they  cannot  comprehend  a  Being  of  the  kind  God  has 
traditionally been held to be. Kant’s view leads, inevitably, to a negative 
estimation of the traditional arguments of natural theology, and implies 
that there is nothing of any real value to be learned from what Kant calls 
‘physicotheology’. If God is necessarily beyond the compass of ‘pure’ or 
theoretical reason, theological ‘theorizing’ is inescapably idle. Accordingly, 
some other form of reflection must be employed to determine what is to 
count as rational in religious belief and practice, and the second Critique – 
of ‘practical’ reason – sets the stage for this alternative. 
   Since, famously, Kant was wakened from his ‘dogmatic slumbers’ by 
Hume, their philosophical orientations are in certain respects importantly 
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at odds. Yet on the matter of religion there is a remarkable commonality 
of method and conception. The purpose of the four essays that comprise 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant tells us, is ‘to make 
apparent the relation of religion to a human nature partly laden with good 
dispositions and partly with evil ones’11). The very same sentence might be 
used to describe the aim of Hume’s Natural History. Though the conception 
of human nature Kant employs is a rational construct, while Hume’s is 
(intended to be) an empirical generalization, human nature’s relevance 
nevertheless lies in enabling Kant’s readers to discern the character of ‘true 
religion’, an expression that he expressly uses, and which he contrasts 
(as Hume also does) with ‘revealed faith’12). Kant finds true religion, not 
in the customary practices of the Church, but in a elevated conception 
of the moral life that is quite at odds with Hume’s blend of hedonistic 
utilitarianism.
   At the end of the same decade in which Kant’s four essays were 
written, another very important work in philosophy of religion appeared – 
Schleiermacher’s On Religion. First published in 1799, these five ‘Speeches 
to the Cultured Despisers of Religion’ show Schleiermacher to be both 
informed about and engaged with many of the philosophical issues that 
exercised Spinoza, Hume and especially Kant. Schleiermacher uses the 
language of ‘healthy’ and ‘diseased’ religion rather than ‘true’ and ‘false’, 
but the theme is the same. Moreover, some of the attitudes he attributes to 
the ‘cultured despisers’, and that he wishes to counter, effectively 
anticipate Nietzsche’s philosophical attack on religion ninety years later in 
Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Nietzsche also, in a very critical 
spirit, is concerned to identify ‘true’ religion, in order to denounce rather 
than to praise it, of course.
   Meanwhile, in a decidedly different philosophical idiom (one that 
Nietzsche despised), we can find essays directly comparable to Hume’s 
11) Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason ed. Allen Wood and George 
di Giovanni, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.39
12) Ibid. p.116
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History and Dialogues in John Stuart Mill’s posthumously published Three 
Essays on Religion. Mill’s essay on ‘Theism’ examines the traditional 
arguments for the existence of God that Hume considers in the Dialogues 
(and to the surprise of his former associates finds some merit in the 
‘design’ argument). In the ‘The Utility of Religion’, however, he expressly 
endorses the investigation of ‘natural religion’ along the lines of Hume’s 
Natural History, and thereby echoes Kant’s investigation into Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as well.
Let us then consider what it is in human nature which causes it to 
require a religion; what wants of the human mind religion supplies, 
and what qualities it developes (sic). When we have understood this, 
we shall be better able to judge, how far these wants can be otherwise 
supplied and those qualities, or qualities equivalent to them, 
unfolded and brought to perfection by other means.13)
   While the focus of Hume’s Dialogues is theology, the focus of his 
Natural History is religion. Yet the second work, no less than the first, can 
be located within a strand of philosophical inquiry that neither began nor 
ended with Hume. Moreover, the two works have something in common; 
the Natural History, like the Dialogues, is a normative inquiry. It concerned 
as much with what is right and wrong and good and bad about religion, 
just as the Dialogues are concerned with the truth or falsity of theism. 
Despite Hume’s famous attack on attempts to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ in 
his Treatise of human nature14), his account of religion crucially depends on 
drawing normative philosophical distinctions between, for instance, 
‘religion’, ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’. ‘True’ religion, in other words is 
both a descriptive and an evaluative conception. Hume’s main purpose 
lies in determining where superstition ends and true religion begins (if 
anywhere). In pursuing this purpose he is undoubtedly following in 
13) John Stuart Mill, Three Essays on Religion, Longman’s Green London, 1874, p.100
14) Treatise Book III, Part I, Sect.1
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Spinoza’s footsteps, because Spinoza also wants to find (so to speak) the 
inner pulse of religion that will enable him to differentiate it from 
dogmatic theology, ecclesiastical politics and empty ritual. For Kames too, 
distinguishing true religion from superstition is crucially important to 
discerning the progress in all aspects of human development to which he 
is committed. And in the same spirit, Adam Smith speaks of ‘pure and 
rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture or 
fanaticism such as wise men in all ages of the world [have] wished to see 
established’15).
   Spinoza, Hume, and Kant, for different reasons, set aside questions 
regarding the truth of metaphysical theism. Smith simply never addresses 
them. At the same time, all of these philosophers were in their own time 
regarded by some as undermining religious orthodoxy. This is because, 
even when they were not engaged directly with question of theological 
truth and Christian doctrine, they presented the proponents and adherents 
of religion with critical intellectual challenges. It is important to 
distinguish philosophical attempts to delineate ‘true religion’ from 
exercises in philosophical theology. Nevertheless, they retain normative 
ambitions that put them in a different category to empirical social sciences, 
which for the most part strive to avoid normative debates. Anthropology 
studies religion, certainly, but would never classify one religion over 
another as ‘true’. The philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment also 
aimed to base their inquiries and conclusions on empirical observation, 
but they did so in quite a different spirit to that of nineteenth century 
positivism. Critical evaluation remained a key part of their endeavor. The 
concept of ‘true’ religion is different from ‘theological truth’, but still 
evaluative. 
15) Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (hereafter WN), Glasgow Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 1976, II/II.V.i.g.8
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III
That the corruption of the best things produces the worst, is grown into a 
maxim, and is commonly proved, among other instances, by the 
pernicious effects of superstition and enthusiasm, the corruptions of 
true religion.16)
The tone of Hume’s remarks in the essay that follows this assertion does 
raise a doubt as to whether he really believed that anything properly called 
‘religion’ could be included among ‘the best things’. In the light of the 
following passage from the Natural History it seems he could not.
Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the 
world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are anything but 
sick men’s dreams: Or perhaps will regard them more as the 
playsome whimsies of monkies in human shape, than the serious, 
positive, dogmatical asservations of a being, who dignifies himself 
with the name of rational.17)
Yet, just a few sentences later he remarks: ‘Look out for a people, entirely 
destitute of religion: If you find them at all, be assured, that they are but a 
few degrees removed from the brutes’. How is the paradoxical character of 
these remarks to be resolved?
   The answer lies in this, I think. Hume holds the spring of religion to be 
emotion, chiefly the emotions of hope and fear. Such emotions feed upon 
ignorance. On the one hand, fear, combined with ignorance, makes human 
beings susceptible to superstition, and thus prey to the manipulations of 
priests, soothsayers and the like. On the other hand, hope, combined with 
ignorance (or at least irrationality), fills people with messianic visions, 
that are advanced with the ‘enthusiasm’ of the prophet and sustained 
16) Hume, Essays, p.75, emphasis original
17) NHR, p.184
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by the dogmas of theologians. Superstition is characteristic of ritualistic 
religions like Roman Catholicism. Enthusiasm is the mark of evangelical 
Protestantism. The two forms have deleterious social effects. Superstition 
renders  people  passive,  gives  power  to  a  class  of self-serving  and 
unscrupulous priests, and sustains rigid political hierarchy. Enthusiasm 
encourages political radicalism, gives rise to fanaticism, and brings the 
danger of social instability and ultimately civil war. Hope and fear cannot 
be eliminated from human nature, but the exercise of reason can temper 
them. Science and philosophy, Hume contends, have the practical function 
of undermining false hopes and groundless fears by informing us of the 
true nature of the world. In this way, reason also serves to ameliorate 
their social effects. Religion, then, does indeed set men off from the brutes, 
but in its ‘true’ or best form, it is philosophical in character (a species of 
philosophy, he explicitly says in the first Enquiry)18).
   Yet if this is true, Hume appears to have undermined the very 
distinction with which his Natural History opens. True religion, it seems, 
can be rooted in reason, at least in the sense that the hopes and fears which 
underlie all religions can be altered, and rendered relatively harmless by 
rational thought. How can this be, though? Reason, by Hume’s account in 
the Treatise, is ‘inert’19), and in any case, the human capacity for reason is 
limited  and  fragile.  In  the  case  of  religion  especially,  it  is  easily 
overwhelmed by the ‘appetite for absurdity and contradiction’ which (he 
says) is regularly exhibited by ‘popular theology’. What real prospect is 
there, then, that ‘philosophy’ – only ever of interest to a few – will succeed 
in mitigating the deep seated drives to ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’ 
which, Hume claims, are built in to our nature?
   In the History of England Hume expressly commends a specific form 
of religion, namely the Anglican Church created by the Elizabethan 
Settlement. If this is what he means by ‘true religion’, however, then it is to 
18) On this see Don Garrett, ‘What’s True about Hume’s ‘True Religion’, Journal of 
Scottish Philosophy 10.2 (2012)
19) Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Part III, sect.3
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be found, not in ‘a species of philosophy’, but in a form of religious ritual 
that is a ‘happy medium’ between the superstition of ‘Romish worship’ on 
the one hand, and the enthusiasm of Protestantism on the other, style of 
worship in which ‘ceremonies, become venerable from age and preceding 
use, were retained’ and in which ‘the genius of ancient superstition’ 
was mitigated by being rendered ‘more compatible with the peace and 
interests of society’. Anglicanism, on this score is not to be commended for 
its philosophical content, but for its church practices, a liturgical middle 
way ‘such as wise men have always sought’20). Hume, we must conclude, 
wavers as much on the nature, and even the possibility, of ‘true religion’, 
as he does on the truth of theism. Though he employs the term, he does 
not seem to have a clear conception of what it is.
IV
A more satisfactory account can be found in Adam Smith, who writes 
about ‘religion’ in both the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of 
Nations. Though Smith is operating with a very similar framework to 
Hume, his treatment of natural religion can be separated entirely from 
issues in theology, because, though Smith appeals to a providentialist 
conception  of  the  world,  he  never  engages  in  natural  theology. 
Furthermore, while, like Hume, he believes that ‘science and ‘philosophy’ 
can mitigate the excesses of superstition and enthusiasm, he also thinks 
that the dimensions of life with which religion is primarily concerned are 
‘of too much importance to the happiness of mankind, for nature to leave 
it  dependent  upon  the  slowness  and  uncertainty  of  philosophical 
researches’21).
   Smith’s principal interest is the same as Hume’s in the Natural History. 
20) David Hume, The History of England in 6 Volumes, Liberty Fund Indianapolis, 
1983 Vol.4, Chp.40
21) Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Glasgow Edition, Oxford 
University Press, 1976 (hereafter TMS) III.5.4
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He wants to identify the source of religion in human nature, and thereby 
determine its proper place in the development of social life. Superstition 
and enthusiasm are marked features of religion as we know it, but they are 
defective forms in which the religious inclinations of human beings show 
themselves. ‘True’ religion, by contrast, can play a beneficial role in the 
lives of individuals and the wellbeing of societies. That is why ‘pure and 
rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture or 
fanaticism [is] such as wise men in all ages of the world [have] wished to 
see established’22).
   By Smith’s account, the benefits of true religion are to be seen first and 
foremost in the psychological and moral lives of individuals. Human 
beings have moral sentiments ‘implanted’ in their nature as deeply as the 
appetite for food or sex. Contra the Stoics, they cannot help caring more 
about their own happiness than that of others, and contra the ‘whining and 
melancholy moralists’ they do not need to feel guilty about this. At the 
same time, human beings are not the rampant egoists of Hobbes and 
Mandeville. The good opinion of others matters to them, and they have a 
rational faculty that enables them to make an impartial assessment of their 
own conduct. Still, in the ordinary course of life, the average human being 
cannot be expected to deliberate with ‘exact justness’ about the best way of 
‘acting upon all occasions with the most delicate and accurate propriety’.
The course clay of which the bulk of mankind are formed, cannot be 
wrought up to such perfection. There is scarce any man, however, 
who by discipline, education and example, may not be so impressed 
with a regard to the general rules, as to act upon almost every 
occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life to 
avoid any considerable degree of blame23).
Moral rules work to the general good because they are the commands and 
22) WN II/II.V.i.g
23) TMS V.1
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laws of a Deity ‘who will finally reward the obedient and punish the 
transgressors of their duty’. This final outcome, Smith observes, may 
sometimes be very hard to discern, and thus hard to believe in. Life does 
not always go well for us, a fact about the human condition that easily 
weakens our moral resolve to abide by moral rules. Indeed, it may 
sometimes appear decidedly advantageous to ignore them. If morally 
good conduct is to prevail, then, what is needed is a ‘sacred regard to 
general rules’, and this where religion comes into its own because (contra 
Hume) no ‘species of philosophy’ could be expected to be of much help.
Religion, even in its rudest form, gave a sanction to the rules of 
morality long before the age of artificial reasoning and philosophy. 
That the terrors of religion should thus enforce the natural sense of 
duty, was of too much importance to the happiness of mankind, for 
nature to leave it dependent upon the slowness and uncertainty of 
philosophical researches24).
Natural religion, as Hume contends, is rooted in emotion. But by Smith’s 
account, some of these emotions are distinctively religious. They include 
‘the natural pangs of an affrighted conscience’ which is marked out as 
special because it is an emotion ‘from which no principles of irreligion can 
entirely deliver [us]’25). Our religious impulses, however, are not purely 
negative – a check upon behavior. They also generate moral confidence 
and sustain hope in times of adversity. Religion locates the ultimate 
vindication of the just over the unjust beyond human welfare and belief. It 
thus enables moral motivation to survive the subversive effects of personal 
temptation, popular opinion and susceptibility to ‘the empire of Fortune’. 
In all these ways, and especially the last, religion is superior to philosophy.
To  persons  in  such  unfortunate  circumstances,  that  humble 
24) TMS III.V.2
25) TMS III.II.9, emphasis added
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philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, 
but little consolation. . . Religion alone . . . can tell them, that it is of 
little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-
seeing Judge of the world approves it. She alone can present to them 
. . . a world of more candour, humanity, and justice, than the present; 
where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue 
to be finally rewarded. . . The same great principle which can alone 
strike terror into triumphant vice, affords the only effectual 
consolation to disgraced and insulted innocence26).
The rules of morality constitute the basis of both personal happiness and 
social well-being, and by giving these rules a ‘sacred’ character, the natural 
religious impulses of human beings give them a firmer foundation than 
‘philosophy’ could ever do. What reason and education can do, on the 
other hand, is correct ‘false notions of religion’. From the point of view of 
society this is a very valuable role, because it is these that are ‘almost the 
only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of our natural 
sentiments’. This is what happens when ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’ 
prevail over ‘true religion’. That is why Smith devotes a lengthy section of 
WN to discussing the proper attitude that political rulers should take to 
religion.
   The evils of superstition and enthusiasm are best averted not only by 
education in ‘science and philosophy’, but also by public entertainments. 
Public religion, though, has the merit of serving both these purposes, the 
first by means of edifying, well-informed sermons, and the second by 
means of communal ceremonies. Religion’s special solemnity serves these 
purposes better than any combination of schools and playhouses. That is 
its strength. When religion falls prey to sectarianism, the very same 
solemnity produces a ‘gross perversion of our natural sentiments’ and 
turns them in divisive and destructive directions. Accordingly, Smith 
thinks, wise rulers will create an ‘established’ religion and support a 
26) TMS II.II.12
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professional clergy to lead it. At the same time they will prevent the church 
to which those clergy belong from being structured in ways that promote 
clericalism, which is to say, the personal and professional aggrandizement 
that leads to the vices of (what the Protestants called) ‘priestcraft’. For 
Smith, the church establishment that prevailed in the Scotland of his day 
offers one of the best illustrations of how religion, properly instituted, can 
serve the best interests of society.
The equality which the presbyterian form of church government 
establishes among the clergy [generates] a more learned, decent 
independent, and respectable set of men . . . who are obliged to follow 
that system of morals which the common people respect the most. . . 
The presbyterian clergy, accordingly, . . . have more influence over the 
minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other 
established church. . . It is . . . in presbyterian countries only that we 
ever find the common people converted, without persecution. . .’27).
The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better 
the uniformity of faith, the fervor of devotion, the spirit of order, 
regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than 
this very poorly endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, 
both civil and religious, which an established church can be 
supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any 
other28).
By Smith’s account, then, true religion will perform a socially valuable, 
twofold function. First, religious sentiments are part of human nature so 
that properly directed, they can play a uniquely important role in the life 
of human beings as moral agents. Conscience is a vehicle of feeling, not of 




ecclesiastical forms can channel deep seated religious sentiments in 
directions that are beneficial to society at large. ‘True’ religion, accordingly, 
both helps the individual to live well by supporting moral integrity, and 
fosters social order by ensuring that religious sentiments do not turn into 
the corrupted and destructive form of superstition or of enthusiasm.
V
Smith’s account of the character and role of natural religion is framed 
within a way of thinking very close to Hume’s, and there are many points 
at which the two writers agree. They disagree in this, that Smith lends 
religious emotions a distinctive character that is not to be reduced (as it is 
by Hume) to particular varieties of the more general emotions of hope and 
fear. Furthermore, on this basis he builds an account of ‘true religion’ that 
more clearly differentiates it from ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’, without 
converting it into a ‘species of philosophy’. The function of true religion is 
to give powerful psychological backing to moral rules. It does so by 
threatening evildoers with hell, and promising heaven to the righteous, 
despite any earthly appearances to the contrary.
   There is one very important limitation to this way of thinking, however. 
The motivating force of this religious sanction rests entirely on the strength 
of the individual’s conviction. It is enough to believe in heaven or hell; the 
belief need not be true. Conversely, the reality of heaven and hell cannot 
motivate the person who believes them to be pious fictions. Furthermore, 
any religious belief, however ill founded, is as good as any other, if it 
adequately serves the purpose of powerfully inclining those who believe it 
to act in accordance with the moral rules that social life requires. In turn 
this carries the further, very odd, implication that ‘true religion’ can be 
completely divorced from the truth of any of the beliefs that its adherents 
profess. Smith, as has been observed, assumes the truth of theological 
‘providentialism’. But for his account of true religion, this is strictly 
unnecessary. The only critical question for anything that purports to be 
‘true religion’ is: ‘Does it work?’
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   This indifference to the truth of religious beliefs will strike many 
people, not simply as a limitation, but a deficiency in Smith’s account of 
true religion. If it is, this re-opens the question of whether the philosophy 
of ‘natural religion’ and the propositions of ‘natural theology’ can 
ultimately be separated. But even if we continue to suppose that they can, 
there is further reason to hold that Smith’s treatment of true religion has 
an important lacuna in it. Among the sentiments that Smith identifies as 
components of a truly virtuous life, there are three that he characterizes in 
notably religious language. Their connection with right and wrong action, 
it may be argued, is not intelligible if it is cast entirely in terms of 
conformity to moral rules.
   According to Smith there are two standards by which we might judge 
the adequacy of our own moral conduct. The second of these standards is 
based on human norms. We can judge ourselves to have acted (or failed to 
have acted) in accordance with what it is reasonable to expect of anyone, 
if, that is to say, we hold ourselves to the ‘degree of excellence’ that decent 
people ‘commonly arrive at’. The first of the two standards Smith appeals 
to, however, goes beyond empirically observable norms of human 
decency. When we apply this standard to our own conduct, we hold our 
selves accountable to an ‘archetype of perfection’. To judge ourselves by 
the standard of perfection, is in effect to seek to imitate ‘the work of a 
divine artist, which can never be equalled’. This ‘first’ standard, Smith tells 
us, is the one to which the ‘wise and virtuous man directs his principal 
attention’29). From this we may conclude that pursuit of perfection, though 
it exceeds what we can expect of human behavior in general, is not to be 
regarded as a foolish perfectionism, but a truly admirable human trait. The 
religious impulse to imitate ‘the work of a divine artist’, in other words, 
has a key role in moral endeavor.
   A second human sentiment that Smith identifies and commends is this: 
‘A man of humanity, who accidentally, and without the smallest degree of 
blameable negligence, has been the cause of the death of another man, 
29) TMS VI.III.25
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feels himself piacular, though not guilty’, and though he is not guilty, he 
will seek means by which ‘to atone for what has happened, and to 
propitiate’30).  This  ‘piacular’  sentiment  does  not  flow  from  the 
requirements of justice. It is the longing for atonement and propitiation by 
means of sacrifice. These are all distinctively religious concepts, and give 
us reason to think that the emotions that underlie them are distinctively 
religious. In sharp contrast to Hume, however, they are by Smith’s account 
highly commendable.
   Thirdly, there are those ‘natural pangs of an ‘affrighted conscience’ 
referred to earlier. Smith actually describes them as ‘dæmons’ that ‘haunt 
the guilty’ and may ‘drive them to despair and distraction’31). The language 
of ‘dæmons’ may be figurative, but it serves to underline his important 
contention that ‘no principles of irreligion can entirely deliver’ us from 
these, with the implication that only religion can perform this 
psychological function.
   But what kind of religion can adequately assuage this haunting guilt, 
accommodate the piacular feelings of those who are innocent of acting 
unjustly, and underwrite the pursuit of a moral perfection that only God 
can realize? The first duty that true religion requires of us, Smith says, is ‘to 
fulfil all the obligations of morality’32). That is why he commends the 
model of Scotland’s ‘moderate’ Presbyterianianism, an ecclesiology that 
favored services of worship centered on learned and eloquent sermons. By 
means of these, the clergy aimed to edify, encourage, warn and chastise 
their congregations, and for whom the moral rules to which their 
consciences naturally subscribed were thereby reinforced. Sacrificial 
atonement, and the striving after divine perfection, however, appeal to 
ideals beyond the fulfillment of duty. In this way, they exceed what 
‘rational’ endorsement of moral rules requires. Similarly, haunting guilt 
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otherwise merely social rules is acknowledged. The pursuit of perfection, 
the desire to atone, and the pangs of conscience are exceptional sentiments, 
beyond the range of ordinary hopes and fears that get us through 
everyday life. Such exceptional sentiments are more than a stable social 
order requires. Accordingly, they cannot be encompassed within the 
simply ‘reasonable’. Since these are admirable sentiments, they are not in 
need of being tempered by some ‘species of philosophy’. What then might 
shape and direct them?
   Like Hume, Smith is not merely skeptical, but dismissive of ‘the public 
and private worship of the deity’ in many forms. He discounts ‘frivolous 
observances’ ‘sacrifices’ ‘ceremonies and ‘vain supplications’ as having 
any value in themselves, and roundly condemns ‘the futile mortifications 
of the monastery’33). Yet it is by means of just this kind of practice that 
human beings in almost all cultures have sought to shape and strengthen 
the special religious sentiments that Smith himself identifies. How is 
unattainable perfection to be venerated except in worship? How is 
atonement to be made without propitiating sacrifice? How is guilt to be 
relieved except by confession? Even if Smith is right to make morality the 
centerpiece of virtue, the traditional practices of prayer, worship and 
sacrifice of which he is deeply suspicious, may have a more significant role 
than he is willing to allow, and may, in fact, be key to determining what 
‘true religion’ really means34).
33) Ibid.
34) This paper draws on material that first appeared in the opening chapter of my 
Wittgenstein and Natural Religion (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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Abstract
   In the period of the Scottish Enlightenment the term ‘natural religion’ 
was used to refer to two important different phenomena – theological 
beliefs based on evidence drawn from the natural world, and the religious 
impulses that can be found ‘implanted’ in human nature. This paper takes 
two works by David Hume as exemplifying this difference. It critically 
investigates what Hume has to say about natural religion in the second 
sense, and compares it with the approach of his friend and contemporary 
Adam  Smith.  The  paper  argues  that,  though  in  general  the  two 
philosophers have much in common, on the matter of the place of religion 
in human nature, and its social accommodation, they differ significantly, 
and a case is made for thinking that Smith’s account of religion is superior 
to Hume’s.
